A non-verbal turing test: Differentiating mind from machine in gaze-based social interaction by Pfeiffer, U.J. et al.
A Non-Verbal Turing Test: Differentiating Mind from
Machine in Gaze-Based Social Interaction
Ulrich J. Pfeiffer1,3*, Bert Timmermans1, Gary Bente2, Kai Vogeley1,3, Leonhard Schilbach1,4
1Neuroimaging Group, Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, University Hospital Cologne, Cologne, Germany, 2Department of Media and Social Psychology,
Faculty of Human Sciences, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany, 3 Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine – Cognitive Neurology (INM3), Research Center Ju¨lich,
Ju¨lich, Germany, 4Max-Planck-Institute for Neurological Research, Cologne, Germany
Abstract
In social interaction, gaze behavior provides important signals that have a significant impact on our perception of others.
Previous investigations, however, have relied on paradigms in which participants are passive observers of other persons’
gazes and do not adjust their gaze behavior as is the case in real-life social encounters. We used an interactive eye-tracking
paradigm that allows participants to interact with an anthropomorphic virtual character whose gaze behavior is responsive
to where the participant looks on the stimulus screen in real time. The character’s gaze reactions were systematically varied
along a continuum from a maximal probability of gaze aversion to a maximal probability of gaze-following during brief
interactions, thereby varying contingency and congruency of the reactions. We investigated how these variations
influenced whether participants believed that the character was controlled by another person (i.e., a confederate) or a
computer program. In a series of experiments, the human confederate was either introduced as naı¨ve to the task,
cooperative, or competitive. Results demonstrate that the ascription of humanness increases with higher congruency of gaze
reactions when participants are interacting with a naı¨ve partner. In contrast, humanness ascription is driven by the degree
of contingency irrespective of congruency when the confederate was introduced as cooperative. Conversely, during
interaction with a competitive confederate, judgments were neither based on congruency nor on contingency. These
results offer important insights into what renders the experience of an interaction truly social: Humans appear to have a
default expectation of reciprocation that can be influenced drastically by the presumed disposition of the interactor to
either cooperate or compete.
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Introduction
In the last decades, considerable knowledge has been acquired
about how we perceive other persons, how we interpret their non-
verbal behavior, and how we ‘read’ their minds. However, most
experimental paradigms used to this end have relied on testing
individuals in isolation. Thus, social interaction is investigated
without interaction (‘offline’ social cognition), seemingly reflecting
the view that social cognition can be sufficiently understood by
investigating what a single person thinks or believes [1]. In recent
years, this cognitivist and individualist approach to social cogni-
tion has been subject to criticism as it fails to incorporate the
interaction process in itself, i.e. the embodiment of agents in an
interaction, and the situated nature of social interaction (‘online’
social cognition, [2]). Instead, enactive accounts of social cognition
have gained popularity and suggest to investigate interaction
partners in true dyadic interactions [1,3–5]. These accounts are
based on the propositions that i) perception and action are
inseparable from each other, and that ii) meaning emerges from
the active exploration of and coupling with the environment.
One major reason for the scarcity of truly interactive studies in
social cognition research might be the complexity of studying
complex social interaction processes involving the exchange of
subtle and transient cues under standardized laboratory condi-
tions. However rich everyday social interactions present them-
selves, it is of great importance that the bandwidth of the
interaction is restricted substantially in order to study core
processes of interaction whilst maintaining acceptable levels of
experimental control. Keeping this in mind, any endeavor of
assessing real social interaction in fact faces two major challenges.
First, an experimentally controllable domain of social cues needs
to be identified. Second, a task that reliably separates and contrasts
social and non-social interaction must be established.
The first challenge can be met by starting from a subset of
communicative cues, which have high explanatory value for social
cognitive processes and exchange in social encounters and are at
the same time objectively measurable and controllable in an
experimental setting. Such a cue system is ideally represented by
human gaze. Gaze behavior has long been demonstrated to
provide a highly informative window into social cognition [6,7].
Here, an important aspect of social interaction is the ability to
follow another person’s gaze and share a perceptual experience
with someone else, thereby engaging in triadic relations between
self, other, and the environment in joint attention [8]. Joint
attention is believed to be crucial for an understanding of other
minds [9]. An essential distinction has been made with respect to
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the person who is initiating joint attention and who is responding
to bids of joint attention [10]. In line with observations from non-
typically developing humans and research in non-human species,
Moll and Tomasello [11] argue that the natural motivation to
engage others in triadic interactions represents a uniquely human
cognitive factor which might ultimately foster the development of
a shared reality [12]. In addition, as the act of looking is both a
source of stimulation and a response, perception and action are
inseparable in this channel of non-verbal behavior and can hence
be subject to tight experimental control [13].
A powerful paradigm to analyze social gaze in a truly interactive
way has been introduced recently [14] using interactive eye-
tracking and gaze-contingent eye movement simulation. This
setup allows to track a person’s gaze on a stimulus screen and to
control the gaze behavior of an anthropomorphic virtual character
[15] dependent on the current gaze position. For the first time, this
permits the exploration of gaze-based social interaction in an
experimentally controllable way. In an initial study employing this
interactive eye-tracking setup in a functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) environment, it could be shown that self-initiated
joint attention, i.e. making the virtual character follow one’s own
gaze, recruits reward-related neurocircuitry consistent with the
above described idea of an intrinsic motivation to jointly attend to
aspects of the environment [16].
Based on this paradigm, we have developed a gaze-based
version of what is known as the ‘‘Turing test’’ in order to study
which parameters of gaze-based interactions influence humanness
ratings of the virtual character. The Turing test was proposed by
the British mathematician Alan Turing in order to address the
question whether machines can think, i.e., whether or under which
circumstances humans would ascribe human-like intelligence to
machines. In order to address this question he suggested various
experiments, one of which later became known as the standard
Turing test. In this test, a human participant engages in verbal
conversation via a computer screen with another human and a
computer placed in separate rooms via a computer screen and has
to judge with whom he is interacting [17]. If the participant cannot
reliably distinguish between the human and the computer
conversation partner, the machine is said to have passed the test.
The rationale of this paradigm was used in our study to investigate
humanness ascriptions during interaction.
For this purpose, we created a gaze-based version of the Turing
Test, which in the following will be referred to as the ‘‘non-verbal
Turing test’’. In this test participants engage in the ascription of
human agency during social interaction, which will be referred to
as ‘‘ascription of humanness’’ throughout this article. They have to
judge whether they interact with a real human or a computer
based on the gaze behavior displayed by an anthropomorphic
virtual character in response to their own gaze behavior (see
Fig. 1a), while in fact the latter is always the case and the putative
other participant is a confederate of the experimenter. Each
interaction between participant and agent consisted of six events,
during each of which the virtual character would either follow the
participant’s gaze toward an object that was also shown on the
screen or look away from that object (see Fig. 1b). The experi-
mental manipulation consisted in the systematic variation of the
number of gaze-following reactions from zero (i.e. character
always looking in the opposite direction) to six (i.e. character
always following) out of six possible times. In a between-subject
design, we also addressed the influence of prior knowledge about
the putative interactor’s behavioral predisposition in order to
model different social contexts. To this end, we introduced the
interactor as either naı¨ve to the task, cooperative, or competitive.
Based on the literature we hypothesized three distinct outcomes
in the different conditions: (1) Congruency-based judgment in naı¨ve
interaction: The significance of self-initiated joint attention in social
cognition has been highlighted above. Particularly the data by
Schilbach et al [16] suggest a motivational aspect of initiating joint
attention that is reflected both on the neural and the behavioral
level. This might be taken to suggest that humanness ascription
should increase with increasing congruency of gaze behavior, i.e.
that the experience of interacting with another person increases
with the degree of gaze-following when nothing else is known
about this person. (2) Contingency-based judgment in cooperative
interaction: In definitions of cooperation, particular emphasis is
put on the necessity of coordination between the cooperative
interactors [18]. Therefore, we hypothesize that any form of
coordinated reactions could be taken as indicative of a human
interaction partner. Importantly, not only maximal gaze-following
but also maximal gaze aversion is a highly coordinated interaction
pattern as both patterns are maximally contingent upon the
participant’s gaze. The difference with respect to the participant’s
gaze is that one pattern is congruent and the other is incongruent.
Hence, if coordination played a greater role in humanness
ascription when encountering a cooperative interactor, contingent
rather than merely congruent reactions should inform participant’s
Figure 1. The non-verbal Turing test. (a) Set-up of the experiment with a volunteer participating in the study on the right and a confederate of
the experimenter acting as a putative interaction partner on the left. (b) One exemplar interaction block of the experiment consisting of six
interaction events.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027591.g001
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judgments. (3) Unpredictability-based judgment in competitive interaction:
In the light of the hypotheses on how humanness is ascribed in
situations with a naı¨ve or a cooperative interactor, it might be
anticipated that participants would expect a competitive person to
avoid any patterned response and hence will not interpret any
form of congruency or contingency as indicative of a competitive
interactor. Figure 2 provides an illustration of these hypotheses.
Methods
Participants
In total, 128 healthy male and female volunteers aged 19 to 42
years (mean age = 26.7265.31), with no record of neurologic or
psychiatric illnesses participated in the study. They were recruited
using an internet-based system [19]. All participants were naı¨ve
with respect to the task and to the scientific purpose of the study
and were equally compensated for their participation (10 Euro/
hour). In the beginning of the study participants were asked to sign
a written consent form in which they approved that participation is
voluntary and that data are used in an anonymized fashion for
statistical analysis and scientific publication. The study strictly
followed the WMA Declaration of Helsinki (Ethical Principles for
Medical Research Involving Human Subjects) and was presented
to and approved by the ethics committee of the medical faculty of
the University of Cologne, Germany.
Setup and Materials
We made use of a recently developed interactive eye-tracking
paradigm [14]. This method allows participants to interact with an
anthropomorphic virtual character by means of their eye-
movements. In order to detect participants’ eye-movements we
used a high resolution eye-tracking system with a digitization rate
of 50 Hz and an accuracy of 0.5u (TobiiTM T1750 Eye-Tracker,
Tobii Technology AB, Sweden). Participants were seated at a
distance of 80 cm in front of the device. Stimuli were presented on
the 17’’ TFT screen of the eye-tracking device with screen
resolution set to 1024 by 768 pixels. The viewing angle was 32624
degrees for the whole screen. A PC with a dual-core processor and
a GeForce 2 MX graphics board controlled the output of the eye-
tracker as well as stimulus presentation at a frame rate of 100 Hz.
Via a fast network connection gaze position updates were
transferred to dedicated gaze extraction software (ClearviewTM,
Tobii Technology AB, Sweden) which produced real-time gaze
position output. This was made available to and used by the
Presentation software (PresentationTM, http://www.neurobs.
com) to control stimuli in a gaze-contingent manner.
Task
The interaction was organized in interaction blocks of six events
each (Fig. 2b). Each of these events had the following order:
Participants first had to look at the virtual character. Once the
program had detected a fixation of the virtual character two grey
squares appeared on the left and the right side of the screen (see
[14] for details on the gaze processing algorithm). Participants
subsequently had to choose one of the squares by fixating it. Upon
fixation the chosen square changed its color from grey to blue to
provide feedback about successful gaze detection for the
participant. Participants were told that their first gaze to one of
the squares (but not the color change) was transferred to the screen
of the eye-tracking device of the other participant in real time and
that they would see the other participant’s response to this as
visualized by the eyes of the virtual character visible on their
stimulus screen.
As part of the ‘‘cover story’’, participants were told that in a
given interaction block the eye-movements of the virtual character
could either be controlled by the partner or by a computer
program. After each block, the participant’s task was to judge
whether they had been interacting with the human partner or with
the computer program. In actual fact, the other person was a
confederate of the experimenter and the eye-movements of the
virtual character were always controlled by the computer
algorithm. Interaction blocks consisted of six interaction trials,
thus allowing for a systematic manipulation of the virtual
character’s gaze-following or gaze aversion behavior from zero
to six out of six (0/6 to 6/6) possible times. Gaze-following thereby
constituted a joint attention event, whereas gaze aversion
constituted a non-joint attention event. Overall, this resulted in
seven conditions (0/6, 1/6, 2/6, 3/6, 4/6, 5/6, 6/6) each of which
was repeated eight times in a fully randomized fashion during the
course of the experiment. The latency of the virtual character’s
gaze reaction was jittered between 350 and 600 milliseconds. This
resulted in gaze latencies that have previously been found to
appear natural to participants (unpublished data). Joint and non-
joint attention events were distributed randomly within each
interaction block. At the end of each block participants were asked
to indicate via button press whether they had been interacting with
the other person or the computer program.
Procedure
At the beginning, participants were seated at a distance of about
80 cm from the eye-tracking device. Instructions were provided in
a standardized manner on the screen. Participants were informed
that during the experiment they would be asked to engage in
interaction with a virtual character presented on a computer
screen in front of them by looking at the character and by looking
at objects also visible on the screen. After the participant was
briefed (see descriptions of experiments 1 – 5 for details), the
confederate (in the following referred to as the ‘‘interactor’’), who
was said to be instructed simultaneously by a second experimenter
in a different room, was brought into the testing room and seated
in front of the second eye-tracking device. The two persons were
placed about 4 meters apart from each other and were visually
Figure 2. Hypotheses of humanness ascription under changing
situational demands are depicted here as simple models. (1)
Naive interaction: The ascription of humanness is based on maximally
congruent reactions (solid line). (2) Cooperative interaction: The
ascription of humanness is based on the mere contingency of reactions
(dotted line). (3) Competitive interaction: The ascription of humanness
is neither based on congruency nor on contingency of gaze reactions
(dashed line).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027591.g002
Non-Verbal Turing Test
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 November 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 11 | e27591
separated by a room-divider. The experimenter then engaged in a
brief, scripted conversation with the interactor, thereby repeating
some of the instructions to make the cover story believable for the
actual participant. Before the experiment started, the participants’
sitting position in front of the eye-tracker was optimized and the
eye-tracker was calibrated using a five-point calibration routine to
obtain valid gaze positions in a stimulus-related coordinate system.
The participant was lead to believe that exactly the same
procedure was applied for the interactor. Subsequently, the real
participant engaged in three interaction blocks to be familiarized
with the task. After this practice session, remaining questions of
the participant were answered. Both the participant and the
interaction partner were then instructed not to communicate
verbally with each other during the experiment and were asked to
wear headphones in order ‘‘to prevent acoustical interferences’’ with
their task performance. The eye-trackers were then recali-
brated and the experiment started. After 28 of the 56 interaction
blocks there was a 30 second break. Upon completion of the
experiment, the partner was brought to another room while the
participant was asked to fill out a brief questionnaire in which they
had to indicate how difficult they had found the task on a 4-point
scale, whether they had based their decision on considerations of
human behavior or computers, whether they had used a certain
strategy in the interaction, and whether there were specific criteria
on which they based their decision. They were also asked to
explicitly describe potential strategies and criteria. After completion
of this questionnaire, all participants were debriefed and informed
about the goal and purpose of the experiment. In total, the complete
experimental session lasted approximately 50 minutes.
Data Analysis and Presentation
All data were analyzed using PASW Statistics 18 (SPSS Inc,
Chicago, IL, www.spss.com). One-way ANOVAs for repeated
measures were used to analyze the effect of the degree of gaze-
following which was included in the analysis as a factor with seven
levels. In order to be able to apply parametric statistics on
proportional data, such as obtained from participant’s judgments,
all data were arcsine transformed [20,21]. Planned polynomial
contrasts were applied for trend analysis. In addition to the main
manipulation of the task, i.e. the systematic variation of the virtual
character’s gaze-following behavior, the gaze behavior of the
participants themselves was analyzed to detect possible influences
on the ascription of humanness. Whenever appropriate, i.e. for
main effects and planned contrasts, omega squared (v2) is reported
as a measure of effect size [22]. The following conventions for
interpreting v2 are suggested: Small effects: v2,0.06; Moderate
effects: v2.0.06 and v2,0.15; Large effects: v2.0.15 [23]. In the
graphs representing the data, non-transformed data are used with
error bars indicating the 95% confidence intervals. Post-experi-
ment debriefing questionnaires were analyzed by an independent
rater blind to the conditions of the study.
Results
Gaze Behavior of Participants
Before assessing the ascription of humanness based on the gaze
reactions of the virtual character, we aimed at excluding potential
effects of participants’ own gaze behavior on performance. Two
aspects of participants’ gaze behavior were evaluated. In a first
step, we investigated whether participants looked equally often to
the left and right objects across conditions. This was clearly the
case as indicated by left/right-ratios (Exp.1: 1.08, Exp.2: 1.04,
Exp.3: 1.1, Exp.4: 1.04, Exp.5: 1.08) and supported by a one-way
ANOVA comparing these ratios across conditions that did not
yield any significant differences, F(4, 108) = 2.08, p= .10. In
addition, the consistency of participants’ gaze behavior was also
taken into account. This is important because it is conceivable that
whereas some participants alternate randomly between the left
and right objects throughout interaction blocks, others chose to
always fixate one of the two objects, thereby expressing higher
consistency in their behavior. To assess the possibility that
differences in consistency influence how participants experience
the virtual character’s gaze reactions and thus possibly their
humanness rating, the longest chain of consecutive gaze shifts to
the same object was extracted from each interaction block and
used to calculate an average consistency index for each participant
and each condition. An ANOVA comparing the average
consistency across experiments did not yield any significant
differences, F(12, 408) = 1.11, p= 0.35. Subsequently, the
humanness ratings of each condition with the consistency index
of that condition were correlated. The Pearson correlation
coefficients were then included as a covariate in the repeated-
measures ANOVAS employed for the within-group analyses of the
effect of the independent variable (i.e. character’s gaze-following
behavior) on the dependent variable (i.e. the ascription of
humanness) that will be described in the following sections.
Experiment 1: Interaction with a Naı¨ve Confederate
In what we consider as the baseline task, the confederate was
introduced as naı¨ve to the participants’ task. This means that he
did not know that the real participant had to answer the question
whether he had the impression to be interacting with another
human or a computer program. We explicitly instructed
participants that the confederate was unaware of the computer
program randomly taking control of the virtual character’s eye
movements and of their task and thus could not knowingly help
them in answering the question.
Participants. 26 healthy volunteers participated in this study
(M = 26.34, SD = 5.12; 14 female). One female and one male
participant needed to be excluded from the analysis due to
technical problems during the experiment.
Results. The effects of increasing degrees of gaze-following on
humanness ascription are depicted in Figure 3a. The results indicate
that the proportion of human ratings increases with an increasing
degree of gaze-following by the virtual character. A one-way
repeated measures ANOVA including the degree of gaze-following
as a factor with seven levels was performed on the data. Mauchly’s
test indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated
(x2 = 59.83, p,.001). Degrees of freedom were therefore corrected
by using the Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (e= .54).
The results show a main effect of gaze-following on the ascription of
humanness, F(3.23, 74.34) = 5.31, p= .002, v2 = 0.12. Polynomial
contrasts revealed a significant linear trend, F(1, 24) = 13.54,
p= .001, v2 = 0.26, thereby confirming the initial observation.
Discussion. Consistent with the literature on social gaze and
social interaction, we hypothesized that participants would base
their decision on congruent reactions to their own behavior.
Indeed, the results show a highly significant linear trend and
demonstrate that, when interacting with a putatively naı¨ve
confederate, participants’ ratings in favor of a human interaction
partner increased with increasing degrees of gaze-following. This
indicates that during interaction with an unknown person there
might be a default expectation of congruent reactions.
Experiment 2: Interaction with a Cooperative Interaction
Partner
It has been argued that humans have a predisposition to interact
cooperatively as soon as they interact [24,25]. To assess whether
Non-Verbal Turing Test
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the introduction of an explicitly cooperative context would either
reinforce the congruency-based pattern of humanness ascription
found in the previous experiment or would rather lead to a
contingency-based pattern, we introduced the interaction part-
ner as being aware of the participants’ task in experiment 2.
In addition, he was described as having been instructed to
‘‘cooperate’’, thus making the task as easy for the participant as
possible. To stimulate a cooperative mindset, we also informed the
participant that they both would receive additionally money if
cooperation would lead to more correct decisions between human
interactor and computer program.
Participants. 28 volunteers participated in this experiment
(M = 26.96, SD = 6.65; 13 female). Two male participants were
excluded because they did not believe the cover story.
Results. Figure 3b illustrates the mean responses for
participants interacting with an interactor previously introduced
as cooperative. Mean responses provide a first hint that during
cooperative interaction the mere contingency seems to play an
important role in humanness ascription. Again, Mauchly’s test
showed that the assumption of sphericity was violated (x2 = 80.92,
p,.001), and the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used
(e= .40). Here, too, the degree of gaze-following had a highly
significant effect on the ascription of humanness, F(2.37, 59.3)
= 22.63; p,.001, v2 = 0.38. There were highly significant linear,
F(1, 25) = 20.48; p,.001, v2 = 0.20, quadratic, F(1, 25) = 38.3;
p,.001, v2 = 0.47, and cubic, F(1, 25) = 9.2; p= .005, v2 = 0.05,
trends describing the u-shaped response pattern. A repeated-
measures ANOVA including cooperativeness (experiment 1 vs.
experiment 2) as a between-subjects factor showed that there was a
significant difference in humanness ascription between experi-
ments 1 and 2, F(3.13, 150.17) = 7.04; p,.001.
Discussion. Introducing the putative interaction partner as
cooperative had a striking influence on the pattern of the ascription
of humanness to the virtual character, which primarily followed a
contingency-based pattern. Participants appear to discount the
expectation of congruency of an interactor’s reaction if the inter-
actor is introduced as cooperative, indicating that in a coopera-
tive context coordinated reactions seem to be more indicative of a
human interactor than simple congruent reciprocation.
Experiment 3: Interaction with a Competitive Interaction
Partner
This experiment assessed whether one of the prevalent response
patterns from experiments 1 and 2 would still appear in a
competitive situation. To this end, participants were informed that
the confederate was aware of their task and instructed that he
Figure 3. Experiments 1, 2, and 3: The ascription of humanness to a virtual character during interaction with an interactor that is (a)
supposedly naı¨ve to the participants’ task, (b) introduced as cooperative, (c) or as competitive.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027591.g003
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should behave in a competitive way, hence making the decision as
difficult as possible. To accentuate this manipulation, participants
were told that they could earn extra amounts of money depending
on their success rate. Conversely, the reimbursement of the other
person was said to depend on his ability to trick the participant. It
was hypothesized that participants would avoid the ascription of
humanness in situations of maximal congruency or contingency of
gaze reactions.
Participants. 21 healthy volunteers participated in this
experiment (M = 29.9, SD = 4.95; 9 female).
Results. In Figure 3c the ascription of humanness in the
presence of a competitive interactor is depicted. It is obvious that
none of the previously described response patterns can be observed.
Again, the assumption of sphericity was violated (x2 = 35.35, p= .02)
and the Greenhouse-Geisser correction (e= .57) was employed in an
ANOVA which did not show any significant effect of the degree of
gaze-following on humanness ascription, F(3.4, 61.16) = 1.11;
p= .364, and hence confirms the initial observation. Repeated
measures ANOVAs including experiment (experiment 3 vs.
experiment 1; experiment 3 vs. experiment 2) as a between-
subjects factor demonstrated that humanness ascription during
competitive interaction differed significantly from cooperative
interaction, F(3.31, 134.75) = 14.17; p,.001, and showed a
strong trend towards significance compared to the interaction
with a naı¨ve interactor, F(3.53, 148.21) = 2.34; p= .056.
Discussion. As predicted, when interacting with a competitive
interactor, neither congruency nor mere contingency of reactions
played a role in influencing the ascription of humanness. This
demonstrates that participants expect a competitive partner to avoid
reciprocation and coordination, thus further corroborating the
importance of congruency and contingency in experiencing an
interaction as an interaction with a human interactor.
Debriefing Questionnaires
For a better understanding of how participants addressed the
task their responses in the post-experiment debriefing question-
naires were analyzed (see Figure S1). These questionnaires
included four questions:
(1) Did participants base the ascription of humanness on
considerations of human behavior or the function of a computer?
Overall, the vast majority of participants based their ratings on
considerations about human behavior (90.52%) rather than solely
the function of computers (9.48%) while performing the task. This
suggests that the non-verbal Turing test did not assess participant’s
hypotheses about how computers are programmed but indeed the
experience of interaction with other persons.
(2) How difficult did participants rate the task on a scale from 1
(easy) to 4 (difficult)? The condition to which participants were
assigned had a significant effect on their difficulty ratings, F(2, 64)
= 6.04, p= .004. Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the three
experiments revealed that difficulty ratings of participants who
had interacted with a putatively cooperative interactor (i.e.
Experiment 2) were significantly lower (M = 2.59, 95% CI [2.32,
2.88]) compared to difficulty ratings in the naı¨ve (M = 3.1, 95% CI
[2.86, 3.35]), p = .017, or competitive (M = 3.23, 95% CI [2.94,
3.51]), p= .004, condition. This indicates that the ascription of
humanness was easiest for participants who had interacted with a
cooperative interactor.
(3) Did participants use any behavioral strategy to unravel the
nature of their interactor? An analysis of the presence of a strategy
did not reveal any significant difference between the three
conditions, F(2, 67) = 1.84, p = .17, indicating that the nature of
the interaction partner did not have any effect on how strategic
participants addressed the Turing test.
(4) Could participants report any specific criterion for deciding
between having interacted between a human and a computer? A
one-way ANOVA revealed that the condition had a significant
effect on whether participants had a specific criterion for
humanness ascription, F(2, 67) = 10.99, p,.001. Tukey post-hoc
comparisons showed that participants who had interacted with a
putatively competitive interactor had significantly fewer explicit
criteria for humanness ascription (M = 0.10, 95% CI [0.01, 0.24])
compared to the naı¨ve (M = 0.46, 95% CI [0.37, 0.78]), p = .032,
or cooperative (M = 0.58, 95% CI [0.37, 0.78]), p= .003,
condition. The proportion of explicit criteria did not differ
between the naı¨ve and the cooperative condition.
Eventually, we also looked at the comments in the question-
naires in a descriptive way. Notably, a considerable number of
participants indicated that they expected a human interactor to
either always follow their gaze or always avert their gaze and
simply counted the occurrence of the expected reactions. In the
following section two experiments including a concurrent cognitive
load task will address the issue whether the Turing test provides a
measure of strategic reasoning about humanness or rather of the
implicit experience of an interaction as social.
Experiment 4: Interaction with a Naı¨ve Confederate
under Increased Cognitive Load
The possibility that participants simply test ad hoc hypotheses
about human behavior in order to solve the Turing test provides a
potential problem to our approach which aims at unraveling the
factors that lead to the phenomenological experience of an
interaction as an interaction with another human rather than
strategic behaviors that might inform a decision between mind and
machine. Social cognition has been distinguished from other
domains of cognition by a high degree of automaticity and
reflexivity of its core processes [26,27]. An increase of cognitive
load in a so-called dual-task design is known to burden effortful
reflective rather than automatic reflexive processes due to competition
for limited cognitive resources [28]. In experiment 4 participants
were instructed in the same way as in experiment 1. However,
when the object changed color, a random number between 2 and
9 appeared superimposed on it. The concurrent cognitive load task
consisted in adding up all six numbers that appeared during one
interaction segment and to enter the sum after giving the response
with respect to the nature of the interaction partner. We expected
this manipulation to distract participants from any explicit strategy
they could employ to inform the ascription of humanness.
Participants. 26 volunteers participated in this experiment
(M = 25.85, SD = 3.3; 14 female). One participant needed to be
excluded from the analysis because he did not believe the cover
story.
Results. The results of humanness ascription during
interaction with a naı¨ve partner under cognitive load are
depicted in Figure 4a. As in experiment 1, human ratings
increase with increasing gaze-following. Mauchly’s test indicated
that the assumption of sphericity was violated (x2 = 90.23; p,.001)
and degrees of freedom were corrected using the Greenhouse-
Geisser estimates of sphericity (e= .36). The results of a one-way
repeated-measures ANOVA indicated a highly significant effect of
gaze-following on humanness ascription, F(2.16, 47.51) = 10.45,
p,.001, v2 = 0.24. Polynomial contrasts revealed both a highly
significant linear, F(1, 20) = 12.87, p = .001, v2 = 0.29, and
quadratic trend, F(1, 20) = 11.09, p= .001, v2 = 0.16, as in
experiment 1. A repeated measures ANOVA including experi-
ment as a between-subjects factor (experiment 4 vs. experiment 1)
showed that humanness ascription during interaction with a naı¨ve
partner was not significantly affected by the presence of a
Non-Verbal Turing Test
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concurrent cognitive load task, F(2.89, 137.51) = 0.59, p= .62, and
thus confirmed the results from experiment 1.
Participants of experiment 4 were eventually separated into a
high- and a low-performance group by means of a median split
based on cognitive load performance. A one-way repeated measures
ANOVA with performance group as a between-subjects factor
demonstrated a significant effect of cognitive load performance on
the ascription of humanness, F(2.71, 56.86) = 2.88, p= .049.
Polynomial trend analysis within these two groups indicates that
the high-performance group shows a stronger linear trend, F(1, 11)
= 21.9, p= .001, v2 = 0.59, compared to the low-performance
group, F(1, 11) = 6.84, p= .024, v2 = 0.28. This is illustrated by
figure 4a which demonstrates that participants in the high-
performance group (solid lines) show a much more pronounced
congruency-based response pattern than those in the low-perfor-
mance group.
Discussion. Overall, humanness ascription in the naı¨ve
condition did not change significantly under concurrent cognitive
load. However, splitting participants into a low- and a high-
performance group demonstrated a clear effect of the load
manipulation: Participants who obtained higher scores in the load
task showed a more pronounced linear trend in humanness
ascription, that is, they based their ratings maximally on the
congruency of the virtual character’s reaction. As higher
performance in the cognitive load task is indicative of greater
distraction by this task, these results emphasize that the congruency
of gaze-reactions is the most prominent cue for humanness
ascription when cognitive resources are burdened during the
Turing test. This can be taken to suggest that congruency-based
responses are produced in an implicit and automatic fashion rather
than being a product of strategic reasoning processes.
Experiment 5: Interaction with a Cooperative Interaction
Partner under Increased Cognitive Load
This experiment followed the same rationale as experiment 4
and assessed the effect of concurrent cognitive load on humanness
ascription during interaction with a cooperative interactor.
Participants. In this experiment, 29 healthy volunteers
participated (M = 25.11, SD = 4.42; 17 female). One male and a
female participant were excluded from the analysis due to
technical problems during the experiment.
Results. Effect of Gaze Reactions. As in experiment 3, the mean
responses suggest that again overall contingency seems to play an
important role in the experience of an interaction as social
(Figure 4b). The Greenhouse-Geisser correction (e= .47) was used
to correct for the violation of sphericity as indicated by Mauchly’s
test (x2 = 84.24, p,.001). Again, the degree of gaze-following had
a highly significant effect on humanness ascription, F(2.79, 72.64)
= 12.52, p,.001, v2 = 0.29, and displayed significant linear, F(1,
26) = 6.03; p,.021, v2 = 0.05, and quadratic trends, F(1, 26) =
25.42, p,.001, v2 = 0.44. As indicated by a repeated measures
ANOVA including the presence of the cognitive load task as a
between-subjects factor (experiment 5 vs. experiment 2) the
addition of a concurrent cognitive load task did not lead to
group differences in humanness ascription, F(2.75, 134.57) = 1.22,
p= .31.
Participants again were separated into high- and low-performers
by a median split of cognitive load performance. Unlike
experiment 4 including load performance as a between-subjects
factor did not yield any significant effect, F(2.65, 63.68) = 0.36,
p= .36. In contrast, humanness ascription differed significantly
between the two cognitive load experiments (experiment 4 vs.
experiment 5), F(3.12, 146,47) = 3.81, p = .011, thus indicating
that the difference in response patterns observed in naı¨ve
compared to cooperative interactions remained consistent despite
the addition of a cognitive load task.
Discussion. The results of this experiment confirmed that
humanness is ascribed based on the mere contingency of gaze
reactions when the Turing test is performed with a cooperative
interactor. Both high- and low-performers equally ascribed
humanness based on contingent rather than congruent
responses, indicating that contingency is the prevalent cue
irrespective of the degree of cognitive burdening imposed by the
cognitive load task. The cooperative interaction hence seems to
Figure 4. Experiments 4 and 5: The ascription of humanness to a virtual character while concurrently solving a cognitive load task.
A median split separated participants with high and low scores in the cognitive load task. Solid lines represent the mean humanness ratings of high
performers, whereas dashed lines represent low performers. (a) During naı¨ve interaction cognitive load performance had an effect on humanness
ascription (p = 0.49). High performers show a stronger congruency-based response pattern compared to low performers. (b) In cooperative
interaction there was no effect of load performance on the ascription of humanness.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027591.g004
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induce an implicit expectation of contingency that is not altered by
any strategic reasoning.
Further Hints to the Implicitness of Humanness
Ascription
In the two cognitive load experiments the focus of the
manipulation was during the interaction phase. The rationale
was that the task would distract people from thinking about the
interaction process and engaging in strategic reasoning about the
task. Nevertheless, the decision between human or computer
might not emerge during but completely after the interaction. To
address this possibility we analyzed reaction times (see Figure 5d).
A one-way ANOVA including all experiments was performed and
demonstrated a main effect of experimental group on reaction
times, F(4, 116) = 3,79, p = .006. Pooling the data into load and
no-load experiments showed that this effect was due to
significantly higher reaction times in the load (M = 2250.7,
SE = 94.4) compared to the no-load (M = 1877.81, SE = 70.23)
tasks, t(119) =22,56, p= .012, suggesting higher cognitive
demands resulting from the combination of the humanness
ascription and the cognitive load task. A one-way ANOVA did
not reveal any significant differences of reaction times between the
no-load conditions (experiments 1, 2, and 3), F(2, 68) = 2.01,
p = .142. A comparison of the two load experiments (experiments 4
and 5) also did not show any significant difference, t(48) = .92,
p = .364. Although this suggests that the decision is made during
the interaction, it cannot be ruled out that reasoning processes
between the end of the interaction block and the button press play
a role in humanness ascription.
To investigate this matter, a median split of reaction times was
performed for all experiments (Figure 5a–e). In the naı¨ve
condition, a one-way repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a
significant effect of reaction time on humanness ascription, F(3.09,
70.99) = 3.02, p = .034, v2 = 0.12. Separate ANOVAs for
participants with short and long reaction times showed that the
degree of gaze-following only had an effect in the fast responders,
F(2.82, 33.79) = 5.39, p= .004, v2 = 0.32, who showed a highly
significant linear trend of humanness ascription, F(1, 12) = 13.02,
p = .004, v2 = 0.32. In the slow responders, there was no such
effect, F(3.4, 37.36) = 1.23, p= .31. In the naı¨ve condition
including cognitive load an ANOVA revealed an effect of reaction
time on the ascription of humanness, F(2.52, 55.48) = 5.44,
p = .004, v2 = 0.22. Similar results as in the naı¨ve condition
without cognitive load were indicated by separate ANOVAs for
slow and fast responders. Gaze-following only had a significant
effect in the fast responders, F(1.74, 20.83) = 17.13, p,.001,
v2 = 0.44, where also a linear trend was present, F(1, 12) = 24.04,
p,.001, v2 = 0.43, but not in the slow responders, F(3.36, 33.55) =
1.8, p = .11. This suggests that the longer participants think about
their decision after the interaction, the lesser they take congruency
into account as a humanness cue. Interestingly, there was no such
an effect for experiments 2, 3, and 5, indicating that during
cooperative interaction, the ascription of humanness is implicitly
based on the contingency of gaze reactions without being influenced
by the time spent on thinking about the decision.
The reaction time data are supported by participant’s responses
to the questions whether they had behavioral strategies and
whether they could mention explicit criteria for humanness
ascription. Concerning the question whether they had used
specific strategies to investigate whether they had interacted with
another human or a computer (Figure S1c), this was significantly
less the case in the experiments including a concurrent cognitive
load task, x2(1) = 6.23, p = .013. In addition, although this was
only a statistical trend, participants did report specific criteria for
the ascription of humanness (Figure S1d) considerably less often in
the cognitive load experiments compared to the experiments with
increased cognitive load, x2(1) = 3.27, p= .07. These results
indicate that manipulation of cognitive load was successful in
reducing strategic behavior of participants as well as their
awareness of specific criteria for the ascription of humanness.
Discussion
In a series of experiments, we have made use of a novel
interactive eye-tracking paradigm to establish what we describe as
a non-verbal Turing test. This setup makes it possible to assess
parameters of gaze-based interaction which lead to the experience
of a truly social encounter with a real human interaction partner.
Hereby we could overcome the paradoxical situation of previous
studies on social cognition in which the behavior of a single person
is observed in isolation from others. The experience of being
involved in interaction is constituted by two aspects: Firstly,
participants in our experiments experience that they are directly
addressed by the virtual character whose gaze behavior is made
contingent on their own in real time. The necessity of ‘‘being
addressed as you’’ has recently been advanced as a second-person
approach to social cognition in the fields of social cognition and
neuroscience [5,29,30]. Secondly, the paradigm enables partici-
pants to directly observe the consequences of their actions on
another agent as it would occur in real-life interaction. This is vital
for making sense of one’s own behavior in an interactive context
and for its adjustment to situational requirements.
This newly developed approach provides important and novel
insights on the process underlying the ascription of humanness to
virtual characters in social encounters. In order to model different
social contexts, participants engaged in the non-verbal Turing test
under changing situational demands: Experiment 1 assessed
humanness ascription during interaction with an interactor who
was thought to be naı¨ve to the task in order to assess the default
ascription pattern when there is no knowledge about the
interactor. Consistent with our hypothesis, participants activated
a congruency-based expectation and increasingly ascribed hu-
manness to the virtual character with increasing degrees of gaze-
following. The results of experiment 2 demonstrate that this
pattern can be modulated depending on the previous knowledge
about the behavioral predisposition of the interaction partner and
changes to a contingency-based analysis of behavior in the
presence of a cooperative partner. As predicted, experiment 3
showed that the ascription of humanness during interaction with a
competitive interactor was neither based on congruency nor on
contingency of gaze reactions.
The Special Case of Gaze
Before turning to an in-depth discussion of our results there are
two controversial issues related to the operationalization of the
interaction process using gaze cues and to the resulting explan-
ations that need to be addressed.
First of all, it might be argued that gaze-following is merely a
form of motor mimicry which refers to a subtle imitation of the
behavior of an interaction partner. Consequently, the ascription of
humanness might rely on mimicry-related processes which are
known to increase rapport, empathy, and liking between mimicker
and mimickee and thereby result in increased bonding of the
interactors [31]. Although gaze-following naturally has an
imitative component, motor mimicry can clearly be distinguished
from gaze-following in a number of respects. Chartrand and Bargh
[32] describe mimicry as non-conscious imitation ‘‘such that one’s
behavior passively and unintentionally changes to match that of
Non-Verbal Turing Test
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others in one’s current social environment’’ (p.893). The
involvement of a distinct task as in our series of experiments
makes it difficult to argue that the other’s gaze-following is passive
or unintentional. Another important argument is that the appraisal
of the mimicker decreases and other positive social effects break
down once the mimickee becomes aware of being mimicked,
possibly because the imitative behavior is evaluated as an
intentional expression of conformity directed at the attainment
of reward or approval [33,34]. In our task it is obvious that the
participant is aware of the other following or not following his
gaze, as this is the criterion on which the decision between human
and computer is based. A further distinction concerns the function
of mimicry and gaze-following. Whereas the main function of
mimicry seems to be the general facilitation of dyadic interactions,
gaze-following is related to triadic rather than dyadic interactions
where it serves the purpose of keeping track of another person’s
focus of attention, thereby paving the way to an understanding of
this person’s mental states [9,10]. The distinct task structure,
participants’ awareness of the other’s reactions, as well as the
functional role of gaze-following clearly argue against any
substantial role of mimicry in the present study.
Secondly, a critical reader might ask whether the effects
demonstrated here are gaze-specific or whether they could
potentially be replicated using different channels of non-verbal
behavior. Undoubtedly, some of the effects reported in this article
might appear in a Turing-test-like study involving other forms of
interaction. However, the aim of the present study was to uncover
the basic aspects of ‘online’ social interaction that lead to the
experience of this interaction as an interaction with another
human. In order to obtain a valid operationalization, we identified
and aimed at fulfilling two main criteria without which the task
could not provide a valid experimental investigation of online
social interaction. First, the task needs to provide a high level of
ecological validity, i.e. both channel and process of the interaction
must be highly salient in everyday social interactions. Second, the
task must provide a high degree of experimental control.
Obviously, other cue system could be used to model contingency
and congruency of an interaction in an experimentally controllable
fashion. For example, a similar study design could involve pressing
a button, moving a cursor, producing a sound or any combination
of these cues. However, this would not satisfy the criterion of
ecological validity as these activities are not part of every-day social
interactions. Furthermore, social gaze is distinct from other
communicative channels in one crucial aspect. Already more
than 40 years ago, Gibson and Pick noted that gaze ‘‘can be
treated as a source of stimulation as well as a type of response. The
eyes not only look but are looked at’’ ([13], p.386) and that hence
in the act of looking perception and action are inseparable. Taken
together, for the following reasons, social gaze seems most ideally
suited for a Turing-test-like assessment of social interaction: (i) It
readily occurs in natural interaction, (ii) it is linked to an
understanding of other’s minds, (iii) it is easily controllable in an
experimental setting, and (iv) it combines stimulation and response
in one action.
The Valence of Gaze Aversion and Gaze-Following
As a key finding, our studies demonstrate that human beings
who interacted with a putatively naı¨ve partner displayed an
implicit expectation of gaze-following behavior and experienced
an interaction as social when the interactor followed their gaze and
engaged in joint attention with them.. This effect is surprisingly
robust given that the only piece of information available to the
Figure 5. Reaction times of humanness decisions split by median. Grey bars indicate mean ratings. Mean ratings of fast responders (reaction
time below median) are indicated by green scatter plot, mean ratings of slow responders are indicated by red scatter plot. Effects of response time
are indicated in brackets. (a) Naı¨ve interactor (p = .034): In fast responders humanness ascription is driven more strongly by congruency than in slow
responders. (b) Cooperative interactor (n.s.). (c) Competitive interactor (n.s.). (d) Naı¨ve interactor + cognitive load (p = .004): Fast responders show
stronger congruency-based response patterns compared to slow responders. (e) Cooperative interactor + cognitive Load (n.s.). (f) Mean reaction
times for all experiments (see text for details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0027591.g005
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participants was that the partner had been instructed to react to
their gaze by ‘‘freely choosing to look to the same or the other
object’’ without being able to willingly help them to solve the task.
Why is maximally averted gaze not indicative of a human interactor? In
the first instance, this might be related to the fact that in the domain
of social gaze valence is an inherent property of the contingency
continuum which ranges from maximal gaze aversion to maximal
gaze-following [6]. The neglect of maximal gaze aversion as a cue to
humanness during interaction with a naı¨ve interactor might be
related to the negative valence of gaze aversion that has been
demonstrated on various levels. For example, in a study on the
effects of gaze cues on person construal it has been shown that
participants produced higher ratings of both likeability and
attractiveness for pictures of people shifting the gaze towards them
compared to pictures of people averting their gaze from them [35].
In another study [36], participants viewed video sequences
displaying a human face either directing its gaze at them or
averting it by looking left or right from time to time. As a between-
subjects factor the degree of gaze aversion was varied. After having
watched the movies, participants had to fill out a social rejection
questionnaire which showed that feelings of exclusion and ostracism
increased with increasing total duration of gaze aversion. In
addition, gaze aversion generally increased feelings of negative
mood and decreased prosocial attitudes. Additional evidence for the
negative valence of gaze aversion comes from an EEG experiment
in which participants viewed live faces displaying either direct or
averted gaze [36]. An analysis of EEG activity revealed that direct
gaze elicited left-hemispheric frontal activation which has been
related to approach motivation. On the contrary, averted gaze
resulted in right-sided frontal activation that has been related to an
avoidance motivation, suggesting that gaze aversion triggers neural
responses related to negative affect [37].
Is there comparable support for a positive valence of gaze-following and joint
attention? A crucial distinction has been made between other- and
self-initiated joint attention. One can either respond to bids of joint
attention by others or initiate joint attention by leading someone’s
gaze. Whereas gaze-following has been observed in other species,
the ability and spontaneous motivation to lead someone’s gaze is
uniquely human. Its function is to share interests and pleasant
experiences regarding objects in the environment with others [10].
For the present study, a recently discovered motivational aspect of
self-initiated joint attention is of great importance. Schilbach and
colleagues [16] report that being involved in joint attention,
irrespective of its initiator, results in the activation of regions of the
so-called ‘‘social brain’’, such as the medial prefrontal cortex. This
region has been implicated in mentalizing, i.e. in thinking about
other person’s goals and intentions [38]. Initiating joint attention
oneself, however, is associated with increased neural activity in the
ventral striatum as part of the brain’s reward system whose activity
changes have been linked to hedonic experiences and the
anticipation of reward [39,40]. In addition, there was a significant
correlation of the strength of striatal activation with ratings of the
pleasantness of joint attention obtained in a post-scan question-
naire. These findings indicate that self-initiated joint attention
triggers reward-related processing and hence provides an intrinsic
motivation for engaging others in joint attention. In other words,
we seek for reciprocation and enjoy being able to elicit congruent
responses from others to our actions. Taken together, we believe
that these positive connotations of gaze-following may be crucial in
informing the ascription of humanness.
From Joint Attention to Joint Action by Cooperation
Our results provide compelling evidence for the significant
impact of prior knowledge about the goal of the presumed
interactor on the experience of an interaction. When the interactor
was explicitly introduced as cooperative, the ascription of
humanness was not based on congruency but rather followed
the actual contingency of the virtual character’s reactions more
closely. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis and indicates
that people were, in fact, not blind to the actual contingencies, but
only integrate them when the interactor’s disposition to cooperate
is known.
How can cooperation lead to the discounting of the expectation of congruent
gaze reactions? Cooperation, in the traditional view, is a behavior
that is selected to provide mutual benefit to both the actor and the
recipient. Cooperation often requires that immediate benefits are
discounted in order to gain a delayed reward [41,42]. However,
cooperation has not only been defined in terms of its fitness
consequences, but also in a mechanistic sense as a form of
behavioral coordination [18]. In this definition, particular emphasis
is put on the necessity of coordination between the cooperative
interaction partners which is regarded as an ‘‘important proximate
mechanism needed to accomplish cooperation’’ ([43], p. 7).
Interestingly, the coordination of behaviors is not only pivotal for
cooperation, but also for joint action [44]. For example, musicians
playing instruments in a band, a couple dancing together, or
construction workers building a house demonstrate cases of joint
action. It is hence possible that the discounting of mere congruency
in the cooperative condition is a consequence of participants
interpreting the interaction as a form of joint action. An analysis of
the degree of coordination expected by participants from a human
interactor and an assessment of the criteria that an interaction needs
to fulfill in order to be classified as a joint action might help to assess
this option.
Does cooperative interaction in the non-verbal Turing test qualify as a joint
action? There are two salient coordinated behavioral patterns that
occur in the Turing test, namely maximal gaze-following or
maximal gaze aversion. Data from the naı¨ve condition suggest that
maximal gaze-following constitutes the most basic and effortless
form of coordinative behavior which seems to be expected ‘‘by
default’’ when people engage in interaction. In the cooperative
situation, any form of contingency is judged as indicative of a
human interaction partner, thus indicating that participants expect
a higher degree of coordination. This strong expectation of
coordinated behavior irrespective of the congruency of reactions
might be taken to suggest that participants understand the
cooperative interaction as a situation of joint action. Fiebich and
Gallagher [45] have recently identified three conditions that need
to be satisfied before interactors can be said to be engaged in joint
action: i) they need to have a shared goal or intention, ii) they must
have common knowledge of aiming at this goal together, and iii)
they have to participate in coordinated patterns in order to reach
this goal. These criteria are fulfilled in the cooperative version of
the Turing test: (i) The shared goal of increasing the common
monetary reward is easily identified for the interaction with a
cooperative interaction partner. (ii) As this has been communicat-
ed explicitly, the participant can also assume that they are aiming
at this goal together. (iii) The contingency-driven response pattern
indicates that participants strongly expected the other to
coordinate his behavior to their actions on a higher level than
mere congruency. We speculate that this demonstrates an intrinsic
expectation of higher-order coordination in cooperation compared
to the unrestrained interaction format in the naı¨ve condition and
thus provides evidence that the interaction with a cooperative
interactor is automatically interpreted as a situation of joint action.
Experiencing Interaction or Thinking about Inter-
action?. It might be argued that the ascription of humanness
could have been based on reasoning processes which are not
Non-Verbal Turing Test
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related to the experience of social interaction. Social cognition has
been described as being largely constituted by automatic processes
are fast, unconscious, and do not require willful regulatory efforts
[27,46]. Hence, if participant’s judgments were the outcome of
conscious, deliberate, and strategic thought processes this would
pose a problem to our claim of presenting these judgments as
measures of the experience of interacting with another human. We
assessed this possibility in several respects. First of all, the addition
of a concurrent cognitive load task in experiments 4 and 5
specifically aimed at interfering with strategic processes during
the interaction process by burdening the cognitive system of
participants.
The results of these experiments clearly demonstrated that
during naı¨ve interaction the increase of cognitive load lead to an
increased in congruency-based humanness ascription. Notably,
participants who obtained high scores in the cognitive load task
based the ascription of humanness more strongly on congruency
than participants with low scores. This indicates that the inter-
ference created by the load task unraveled implicit or automatic
response patterns. In cooperative interaction, on the other hand,
the presence of the cognitive load task had no effect on humanness
ascription, demonstrating that contingency-based responses rep-
resent implicit judgments of humanness. Overall, participants in
the experiments including cognitive load reported that they used
less strategies and less explicit criteria of humanness ascription,
thereby further corroborating the effectiveness of the load
manipulation. Considering that the decision between human and
computer could take place completely after the interaction itself,
reaction times were analyzed by splitting participants into fast and
slow responders. In interactions with a naı¨ve interactor, irrespec-
tive of the presence of a cognitive load task, fast responders base
humanness ascription more strongly on congruency than slow
responders. Taken together, these findings indicate that we were
able to address the implicit processes leading to the experience of
an interaction as an interaction with a human agent rather than
results of careful deliberation that might inform a decision between
mind and machine.
Outlook and Conclusions
Insights into how congruency and contingency of reactions to
our own gaze behavior lead to the experience of an interaction as
social address the interests of various fields of research. For
instance, the current paradigm is likely to provide a useful tool to
investigate impairments of the ability to engage in online social
interaction in psychiatric disorders, such as it is observed in
schizophrenia and autism [2]. The current methodological
developments and empirical results could also inform research
on human-computer interfaces aiming at the development of
virtual agents that appear and behave human in a natural way in
order to facilitate smooth interaction [47,48]. Clearly, such
developments can benefit from research unraveling the core
aspects of human social interaction by using truly interactive
paradigms. Most obviously, however, the adaptation of the present
experimental design for neuroimaging studies will provide a
powerful tool for the study of the neural underpinnings of social
interaction. In this respect, it can be hypothesized that gaze-based
interaction with a naı¨ve confederate might lead to an increase in
neural activity in areas of the mentalizing system such as the
medial prefrontal cortex [49]. In addition, conditions with highly
congruent reactions might correlate with increased activity in
brain areas implicated in the processing of reward such as the
amygdala and the ventral striatum [16,50,51]. While competitive
interaction might also concur with an increase of neural activity in
mentalizing areas it would be interesting to investigate whether the
competitive context could also lead to a decrease of activity in
reward-related neurocircuitry when observing joint attention.
Likewise, an interesting question concerns the neural substrates
of contingency evaluation in a cooperative context: Does the
presence of a shared goal lead to a decrease of activity in the
mentalizing system in favor of activation of brain areas implicated
in coordinated behavior (e.g., [52])? Furthermore, it will be
interesting to investigate whether changes in activation of the
reward system in response to positively contingent gaze-reactions
could generalize to contingent reactions irrespective of their
valence depending on the situational context.
In summary, our results demonstrate that the use of innovative
methodology and experimental designs makes it possible to
address the interaction process itself instead of focusing on the
study of single minds in isolation [1]. Though still rare, truly
interactive paradigms have also been advanced by other
researchers in psychology and cognitive neuroscience [1,53–56].
This emphasizes the need for such studies if we want to understand
why and how we interact with others in a more sophisticated way
than any other species.
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